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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'VILLIAM C. JENSEN, 't 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 
THE INDUSTRIAL co:MMIS- ( 10600 
SION 0}_, UTAH and UNITED ) 
STATES FUEL COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant claims workman's compensa-
tion benefits from the United States Fuel Company as 
a result of an injury received in the course of his em-
ployment at the mine of said company on July 27th, 
1964. Liability was ~enied by the company and on 
1 
March 15th, 1965, plaintiff-appellant made application 
for hearing to settle his claim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The claim was denied by the Commission, petition 
for rehearing was denied, and this review was taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a decision reversing the 
order of the Industrial Commission and directing that 
plaintiff-appellant's claim be allowed. 
STATEl\iENT OF FACTS 
On July 27th, 1964, plaintiff-appellant was em· 1 
ployed in a coal mine by United States Fuel Company 
as a mechanic earning $27.68 per day for a 5-day week. 
About 7 p.m., on that day plaintiff-appellant tes· 
tified that while repairing a roofbolting machine he , 
ducked under its boom, hitting his lower back on a 
pipe fitting (R. 28 and 29). He felt a pain in his back 
(R. 30) at the time of injury and rested for about 15 
minutes to half an hour (R. 31). Spencer Day, fellow 
employee, was present and witnessed the accident (R. 
33) . Day testified plaintiff complained to him about 
his back after the accident and had quite a struggle 
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to get to the train which took him out of the mine ( R. 
57). 
Another fellow employee, John Colosimo, testi-
fied he saw a real dark bruise on plaintiff's lower back 
in the ha thhouse ( R. 59) . 
Another fellow employee, Remo Spigarelli, tes-
tified that on either the 29th or 30th of July the plain-
tiff asked him to carry some tanks because plaintiff 
had hurt his back (R. 63). A week or two later plain-
tiff's boss asked Spigarelli about plaintiff's accident. 
Spigarelli told him plaintiff was having back trouble 
(R. 63). Plaintiff reported to work the next day and 
notwithstanding the pain worked until August 10th, 
1964 (R. 65). 
On August 10th, 1964, plaintiff consulted 'Villiam 
Gorishek, M.D., his family physician, about his back 
pain and had X-rays taken (R. 36). Dr. Gorishek 
diagnosed plaintiff's injury as a herniated disc (R. 
7 and 14), and referred him to the company doctor, 
L. H .. Merrill, because it occurred by accident in the 
course of employment (R. 50 and 99). 
On August 17th, 1964, plaintiff saw the company 
doctor, L. H. Merrill, who refused to examine plaintiff 
because he had not reported the accident to the com-
pany (R. 139). 
The next day, on August 18th, 1964, plaintiff re-
ported the accident to Leon Draper, his foreman (R. 
39). 
3 
The company denied all liability ( R. 39). 
Both L. L. Shepherd and Leon Draper, plaintiff1 
supervisors, denied plaintiff told them he had injurea 
his back (R. 67 and 70). However, Draper admittec 
Day had told him plaintiff had injured or hurt his bad 
on the night in question (R. 75). 
Frank Stevenson, union official, testified the com 
pany's superintendent, Max Robb, told him that plain· 
tiff was claiming an injury to bis back (R. 77). 
After being off work two weeks, plaintiff went 
back to work on August 25th, 1964, and worked untu 
October 23rd, 1964, when he ceased working becaust 
of severe back pain and numbness in his left leg ( R 
49). 
Dr. Gorishek, the family physician, ref erred plain-
tiff to Chester B. Powell, M.D., a Neurosurgeon for 
evaluation and anticipated surgical treatment (R. 8). 
Dr. Powell found plaintiff to be totally disabled in· 
eluding atrophy in the left leg (R. 12). 
Plaintiff was hospitalized between December 18th, 
1964, and December 26th, 1964, for severe left sciatica 
and on December 21st, 1964 plaintiff underwent surgery 
(R. 8 to 14). An interlaminar exploration was per· 
formed and a lumbrosacral left disc was removed. 
Both Dr. Gorishek and Dr. Powell indicate peti· 
tioner's back injury was due to the accident (R. 6 and 
R. 8). 
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On June 18th, 1965, a hearing was held before 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (R. 22 to 87). 
On June 29th, 1965, after the hearing the matter 
was referred to the medical panel with the direction 
that "the panel has no jurisdiction to make a finding 
on the occurrence of an accident" (R. 87). 
On July 26th, 1965, plaintiff entered the hospital, 
had a myleogram on July 27th and on July 29th further 
disc material was excised and a fusion was performed 
(R. 88 and 120). 
On August 13th, 1965, the medical panel made its 
report ( R. 92 to 98) . 
On September 8th, 1965, plaintiff objected to 
the findings of the medical ·panel in writing (R. 109 
to llO). 
On November 12th, 1965, a further hearing was 
held ( R. ll4 to 146). At that hearing one of the panel 
members, Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D., testified that plain-
tiff's back condition was asymptomatic prior to acci-
dent (R. 116); that there was no history of any com-
plaint or injury to plaintiff's back except an accident 
in 1958 which occurred while plaintiff was working for 
defendant, United States Fuel Company (R. ll7) 
and that there was no history of any lost time or of 
any treatment to plaintiff's back prior to the accident 
(R. 117). In addition the panel made no evaluation 
of any permanent disability to plaintiff ( R. ll 7). Nor 
did the panel have the plaintiff disrobe (R. 119), nor 
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did they make even a routine orthopedic examination 
of the plaintiff (R. ll9). Dr. Holbrook, did, however 
' testify that if the plaintiff suffered a blow in the region 
of the protruded disc, it could have resulted in injury 
or disability ( R. 124). Dr. Holbrook further testified 
it was more reasonably probable that the protrusion 
of plaintiff's disc would have occurred even if the acci-
dent had not occurred ( R. 138). 
By letter, dated October 26th, 1965, Dr. Gorishek 
asked Dr. Powell whether the plaintiff's injury aggra-
vated his condition (R. ll2}. 
In reply Dr. Powell stated that plaintiff's history 
plus seven years interval of freedom from symptoms 
would discount prior back symptoms and indicate that 
the injury of July, 1964, was probably the principal 
injury and not an aggravaton of a prior condition (R. 
ll3). 
On February 14th, 1966, the Commission, by Order ' 
received in evidence and adopted the panel report (R. 
146). 
Plaintiff petitioned for rehearing on March llth, 
1966, (R. 147) and on March 16th, 1966, the same was ' 
denied (R. 149). 
POINT I 
THE COM1'1ISSION ACTED ARBITRAR· 
IL Y AND ITS ORDER DENYING RECOV· 
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ERY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
There is no reasonable basis in the evidence to 
sustain the finding that plaintiff's injury would have 
occurred even if the plaintiff's accident had not occur-
red. Industrial Compensation Acts are to be liberally 
construed and where there is doubt it should be resolved 
in favor of recovery. Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 
4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P. 2d 314. Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 1961. 
Here the evidence is uncontroverted that plaintiff's 
disc was asymptomatic prior to the accident ( R. 116) ; 
that he had no lost time due to the back condition (R. 
117); that previous X-rays to determine eligibility 
for employment revealed only moderate scolosis of his 
back (R. 86); that he was re-employed after such X-
rays (R. 129); that he had an accident to his back 
while repairing a machine (R. 55); that he felt pain 
and had to rest ( R. 45 and 55) ; that he had quite a 
struggle to get to the train which took him out of the 
mine (R. 57) ; that he had a real dark bruise on his 
back (R. 59); that he couldn't carry heavy tanks after-
wards (R. 63) and that a competent Neurosurgeon 
reported there was no history of any back symptoms 
or difficulties except for a prior mine accident in 1958 
and that plaintiff's history plus a seven years' interval 
from symptoms would discount prior back symptoms 
and indicate that the injury of July, 1964, was prob-
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ably the principal injury and not an aggravation of a 
prior condition ( R. 113) . 
The Commission in its Order Denying Recovery 
doesn't state that the testimony of plaintiff and three 
of his fellow employees, as above set forth, was dis-
believed and untrue. Plaintiff submits that such evi-
dence should have been accepted as tending to prove 
the date of injury and injury in the course of em-
ployment. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 
328, 172 P. 2d 669. Baker v. Industrial Commission, 
17 Utah 2nd 141, 405 P. 2d 613. 
The Commission's finding that plaintiff's disability , 
was an insidious onset of a protruded disc without 
trauma when the uncontroverted testimony of three of 
plaintiff's fellow employees is to the effect that he had 
an accident and experienced trauma, is not supported 
by the evidence (R. 146). 
The Commission's finding that the accident was ' 
not significant and that the protrusion would have 
occurred had the accident not occurred is not supported 
by the evidence ( R. 96) . The uncontroverted evidence 
is that he did have an accident and that he did become , 
disabled as a result of the accident. The finding in 
question is based on a set of circumstances which did 
not happen and which are not in evidence. In Jones 
v. California Packing, 121 Utah 612, 244 P. 2d 640, 
the Court held that where facts are proved by uncon· 
tradicted testimony of competent disinterested wit· 
nesses and there is nothing inherently unreasonable nor 
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any circumstances which tend to raise doubt of its truth 
they should be taken as established. Refusal to do so 
is an arbitrary disregard of the facts by the trier. 
In the case at bar by denying recovery the Commis-
sion is in effect saying plaintiff did not have a back 
accident and that an accident to the back is not estab-
lished by the evidence. 
The Commission infers that plaintiff would have 
had back trouble without an accident. The difficulty 
with the finding is that there is no doubt under the 
evidence that he did have an accident, and, therefore, 
this finding is not supported by the evidence, and if 
there was doubt then that doubt should have been re-
solved in plaintiff's favor. Purity Biscuit Company 
case, supra. 
Plaintiff is entitled to compensation because his 
disability results from an uncontroverted identifiable 
back accident in the course of his employment, Pintar 
v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276,. 382 P.2d 
414, and the Commission cannot arbitrarily discount 
all competent uncontradicted evidence indicating that 
plaintiff's injury occurred in the course of his employ-
ment. Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2nd 
141, 405 P. 2d 613. 
In Hackford v. Industrial Commission, II Utah 
2d 312, 358 P. 2d 899, it was held that where plaintiff 
had filed his written objections to the panel report the 
burden was on the Commission to sustain it by testi-
mony at the hearing. 
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It is submitted that the testimony at the hearing 
does not sustain that burden. Dr. Powell at the hear· 
ing merely stated that it was more likely that plain-
tiff's disc was caused because of his back condition 
and not by any trauma (R. 136). This bald conclu-
sion, unsupported by any other testimony, is the only 
evidence offered to sustain the burden. If such testi-
mony casts a doubt on plaintiff's right to recover then 
under the Purity Biscuit Company case, supra, that 
doubt should have been resolved in plaintiff's fayor. 
Petitioner is aware that in order to reverse the 
Commission "the record must disclose that there i1 
material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted evi- · 
dence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the 
conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Industrial Com· 
mission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the 
evidence or unreasonably ref used to believe such evi· 
dence." Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 
' 
57 P. 2d 724, and cases cited therein. 
Plaintiff submits this is such a case. 
As authority for the proposition that claimanh 
failure to report imediately is insufficient to defeat 
recovery please ref er to: 
Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 318, 
140 P. 2d 314. 
In the Baker case previously cited and in Hunter r. 
Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 84, 237 P. 2d 813, the 
Court reversed an order denying recovery upon en 
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dence as to accident much less certain and uncontro-
verted than in the case at bar. There is no lack of evi-
dence in the record here as to accident unless the testi-
mony of 4 witnesses is disbelieved in its entirety. 
We submit that, while it may be difficult to dis-
agree with the Commission, the instant case is such a 
case and that plaintiff is entitled to recover for a back 
injury suffered by accident in the course of his em-
ployment. 
CONCLUSION 
That this Honorable Court should reverse the 
Commission and remand the case for a determination 
of plaintiff's degree of disability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. V. LI'TIZZETTE 
178 South Main Street 
Helper, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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